






ABOLISH THE "INSANITY DEFENSE"-WHY NOT?*
JOSEPH GOLDSTEINt AND JAY KATZt
PROLOGUE
THE crin1inallaw is one of many mechanisms for the control of human be-
havior. It defines conduct that is thought to undermine or destroy community
values. It seeks to protect the life, liberty, dignity, and property of the con1-
munity and its members by threatening to deprive those who who contemplate
such conduct and by inflicting sanctions upon those who engage in proscribed
activity. The· sanctions authorized, whether intended to punish, restrain, reforn1,
or deter, constitute a deprivation of life, liberty, 'dignity and property. Because
of the ,inherent conflict between the values ultimately to· be preferred and their
deprivation by the sanctions authorized, the crimil1allaw has sought to minimize
the consequences of this paradox through rules of law which restrict the state's
authority to sanction. One of these rules, a fundamental restriction, is that be-
fore the state can inflict sanctions it· must overcome the presumption of inno-
cence which favots all of us--by establishing beyond a reasonable doubt each
elenlent of the offense charged. By defining crimes in terms of such traditionally
n1aterial elements as a voluntary act purposely causing a specific result, the laws
seeks to exclude fronl criminal liability those who are. not "appropriate" sub-
j ects for a given sanction or indeed for any sanction. Thus, if the state fails to
produce evidence which establishes each element of the crime or, put another
way, if the accused introduces evidence which leaves in doubt any material
element, no sanction can be imposed for the crime charged. To illustrate, the
state cannot hold a person criminally responsible for nlurder if there was no
causal relationship between the shot fired and the death of the. victin1 ; or if the
shot was fired without the intent (1nens rea) to kill,· even though death -was
caused by the shot; or if the victin1 did not die even though the shot was fired
with intent to kill. Recognizing that the elenlents of a given offense may not be
sufficiently precise to exclude all those who ought to be free of criminall~ability,
the state, in order to maxinlize preferred values, has formulated exceptions
which are called defenses. Thus, to prevent the state from actually encourag-
ing criminal activity, the defense of police entrapment, for example, will relieve
an offender of liability even if each element of the crime is established beyond
doubt. The evaluation of any device for sorting out who is and who is not an
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appropriate subject for criminal sanction requires identifying the values in is-
sue. No device haunts the crim'inal law and clouds the values it seeks to re-
enforce nlore than "insanity" as a basis for relieving persons of criminal re-
sponsibility.
WHY BEFORE WHAT
Criminal responsibility results when each element of a crime charged against
an accused has been established beyond a reasonable doubt. Only then is the
state authorized to exercise its power to impose certain specified sanctions
against the offender.1 "Insanity at the time of the offense," we are told, relieves
the offending actor of criminal responsibility.2 This may mean either that "in-
sanity" is to serve as evidence which precludes establishing a crime by leaving
in doubt some material element of an offense, or that "insanity" is to serve as
a defense to a crime, even though each of its elements can be established be-
yond doubt, in order to protect a preferred value threatened by the imposition
of an authorized sanction.3
"Insanity," however formulated, has been considered a defense.4 An evalua-
tion of such a defense rests on first identifying a need for an exception to crim-
1. [T] he meaning of responsibility is liability to punishment; and if criminal law does
not determine who are to be punished under given circumstances, it determines
nothing.
2 STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 183 (1883).
Misleadingly simplified, the material elements of an offense are a voluntary act per-
formed with purpose, knowledge, recklessness or negligence causing with plllrpose, knowl-
edge, recklessness or negligence a result.
On proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the material elements of an offense see MODEL
PENAL CODE §§ 1.12, 1.13 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) and MODEL PENAL CODE Com-
ments at 108-35 (Tent. Draft No.4, 1955).
Sanctions are imposed by the state presumably against, or at least without regard to,
the wishes of the individual being deprived. Implicit in the word "sanction" ... is
involuntariness. In this context involuntariness is not treated as a psychological con-
cept. Thus, for example, imprisonment is a sanction even if imposed on a person who
commits a crime in order to be punished or in order to escape cold and hunger in
the "warmth" of a jail.
Goldstein, J., Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low Visibility De-
cisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 544 n.4 (1960).
2. Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 4 St. Tr. N.S. 847, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843). See
generally DONNELLY, GoLDSTEIN, J., & SCHWARTZ, CRIMINAL LAW 733-844 (1962) (here-
inafter cited as CRIMINAL· LAW) .
3. Louisell & Hazard, Insanity as a Defense: The Bifurcated Trial, 49 CALIF. L. REv.
805 (1961).
4. "Insanity is a defense to be asserted at the trial as any other defense; ..." People
v. Heirens, 4 111. 2d 131, 142, 122 N.E.2d 231, 238 (1954). But see note 20 infra. On samty
apparently perceived as a material element of each offense, possibly as mens rea itself, and
on the burden of proving the defense of insanity, see United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d
751, 761 (3d Cir. 1961) and Ta:tum v. United States, 190 F.2d 612, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1951) :
When lack of mental capacity is raised as a defense to a charge of crime, the law
accepts the general experience of mankind and presumes that all people including the
accused is sane. . . . [But] as soon as some evidence of mental disorder is introduced
. • . sanity like any other fact, must be proved as part of the prosecution's case be-
yond a reasonable doubt.
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inalliability. Unless a conflict can be discovered between some basic objective
of the criminal law and its application to an "insane" person, there can be no
purpose for "insanity" as a defense. Until a purpose is uncovered, debates about
the appropriateness of any insanity-defense formula as well as efforts to evalu-
ate various formulae with respect to the present state of psychiatric knowledge
are destined to continue to be frustrating and fruitless. 5
To demonstrate the kind of analysis we think essential to a meaningful ex-
amination of insanity as a defense, we first analyze the concept of the defense
of self-defense.6 If a person intentionally kills another human being, the crim-
inal law, in support of a basic community objective-the protection of human
life-defines such conduct as a crime and authorizes as the sanction life im-
prisonment of the offender.7 Few would disagree about the ultimate objective
of protecting life and about the elements of the crime,8 but there may be little
or no consensus about the sanction 9 or its purposes. The imposition of life
imprisonment rests on a variety of oft-conflicting and mutually inclusive as-
sumptions shared by legislature, court and community about deprivation of
liberty and its psychological significance. As punishment, life imprisonment is
assumed to satisfy and channel the community's need to express feelings of
vengeance or desires to effect rehabilitation of the offender.10 As restraint, it
is assumed to remove from circulation a person who is believed likely to kill
again, to provide a structure for satisfying community vengeance or to offer
On proving insanity rather than sanity beyond reasonable doubt, see Leland v. State, 343
U.S. 790 (195-2), and see note 33 infra.
5. The quantitative extent of such debate is suggested by the entries which appear
under the heading "Insanity" in the INDEX TO LEGAL PERIODICALS. Since the Durham
case (1954) over 150 articles have appeared whose titles indicate that they deal with some
aspect of the insanity-defense controversy. The Durham case itself has provoked almost 50
law journal notes or extended discussions. As of Jan. 1963, according to SHEPARD'S FED-
ERAL REpORTER CITATIONS, D1lrham had been cited-both favorably and unfavorably-in
approximately 140 cases.
6. The threat to self can, of course, be treated as evidence casting doubt on voluntari-
ness as a requisite element of the crime of murder.
7. We exclude from our analysis of sel£-defens'e the death penalty which may accom-
pany a finding of murder in the first degree, for feelings about that sanction are likely to
distort the already complex issues to be unravelled. See SELLIN, THE DEATH PENALTY,
A REpORT FOR THE MODEL PENAL CODE PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE (1959),
and generally ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1949-1953, REPORT, CMD
8932 (1953), CRIMINAL LAW 304-48.
Moreover, we exclude consideration of certain lesser included or other offellises for
which the defendant may be conrvicted if each of the elements of some other offense is
established beyond doubt.
8. As one of the great objectives of all law, and particularly of criminal law, is the
protection of life, it follows that homicide must, as a rule, be unlawful, so that it is
necessary to consider only those cases in which it is lawful.
3 STEPHEN, Ope cit. supra note 1, at 11.
9. On the dispute about the death penalty as an appropriate sanction see SELLIN, and
ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, Ope cit. supra note 7.
10. Life imprisonment does not necessarily mean imprisonment for life. See, e.g.,
CONN. GEN. STAT. ch. 961, § 54-125 (1958) making persons sentenced to life imprison-
ment eligible for parole on the expiration of a minimum of 20 years.
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an institutional opportunity for care and rehabilitation. As rehabilitation, it
is assumed to reduce the likelihood that he who has killed once will kill again,
to increase the likelihood of returning a life to the community or to provide a
basis for rationalizing community vengeance. As a deterrent of others, it is as-
sumed' to reinforce internal controls over the urge to kill through external
threats of punishment, restraint, rehabilitation and the accompanying stigma.11
Thus, via 'a variety of assumptions which mayor may not be related to an
actual impact on anyone offender or on other members of the community, life
imprisonment becomes the sanction for one who kills another intenttionally.
Intentional killing in defense of self, however, is an exception which denies
the state authority to inlpose the sanction authorized for intentional killings.
This exception "rests upon the necessity of allowing a person to protect hinl-
self from ... [lethal] harm in cases where there is no tinle to resort to the law
for protection."12 Thus under circumstances where, by definition, one of two
n1ust die, the law seeks a solution least incompatible with its overall objective
of protecting life by preferring the life of the "law-abiding" citizen. He is the
man whose inner controls reinforced by the threat of external sanction hold in
check his urge to kill except when his own life is jeopardized by someone not
so deterred. The law thereby recognizes that the sanction for intentional kill-
ings is drained of any deterrent strength when external reality's system for
11. Psycho-analysts have drawn attention to three main motives in our attitude to-
wards law-breakers and criminals that operate in addition to the conscious reasons
that are more readily recognized.... In the first place, the criminal provides an
outlet for our (moralized) aggression. In this respect he plays the same role as do
our enemies in war and our political scapegoats in time of peace. That some very
real satisfaction is to be found in this way is shown by the vast crowds that attended
public executions. . . . In the second place, the criminal by his flouting of law and
moral rule constitutes a temptation to the id; it is as though we said to ourselves,
"if he does it, why should not we?" This stirring of criminal impulses within our-
selves calls for an a11lswering effort on the part of the super-ego, which can best
achieve its object by showing that "crime doesn't pay." This in turn can be done
most conveniently and completely by a demonstration on the person of the criminal.
By punishing him we are not only showing him that he can't "get away with it" but
holding him up as a terrifying example to our own tem'pted and rebellious selves.
Thirdly ... is the danger with which our whole notion of justice is threatened when
we observe that a criminal has gone unpunished. The primitive foundation of this
notion . . . lies in an equilibrium of pleasures and pains, of indulgence and punish-
ment. This equilibrium is disturbed, either if the moral rewards of good conduct are
not forthcoming . . . or if the normal punishments of crime are absent or uncertain
.... It is to prevent disturbance of the latter kind that we insist that those who
have broken the law shall be duly punished. Through their punishment the equilibrium
is re-established, without it (so we dimly feel) the whole psychological and social
structure on which morality depends is imperilled.
FLUGEL, MAN, MORALS AND SOCIETY 169-70 (1945).
On the oft-conflicting purposes reflected in authorized sanctions see, Goldstein, J., Police
Discretion Not to Invoke the Crim-inal Process: Low Visibility Decisions in the Adminis-
tra.tion of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 544-50 (1960).
12. 5 WIS. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, JUDICIARY COMMITTEE REpORT ON THE CRIMINAL
CODE 44 (1953).
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protecting life fails and in turn releases internal reality's instinct for self-pres-
ervation.13 Conceptualized another way, authorizing the potential victim to kill
his assailant constitutes a sanction which may be assumed to fulfill punitive,
restraining, and deterrent functions in the service of the community's objective
to safeguard human life.14 To generalize, when a situation is identified in which
the application of the authorized sanction would conflict with basic criminal
law objectives, a rational system of law would seek first to articulate why such
an application is inappropriate and then to formulate the exception to accord
with those objectives.
Having articulated the reasons for an exception to liability for intentional
killings in defense of self, it becomes possible to evaluate such competing for-
nlulations as for example, (a) the actor's "right to stand his ground" and meet
force with force,15 or (b) the actor's duty to "do everything reasonably pos-
sible to escape [without resorting] to the use of deadly force."16 Formulation
(a) subordinates the value of safeguarding human life whenever possible to
the values of safeguarding a threatened man's right to protect his interest in
property as well as his right to be free from the stigma or uneasiness associated
with cowardice. Formulation (b) prefers the value of safeguarding human life
whenever possible. Conceptually, and probably in practice, the second formula-
tion would best serve to protect both lives. Its application would restrict to a
minimum the number of instances where reality leaves no choice and forces
favoring one life over another.17 The sanction authorized for intentional kill-
ings, therefore, remains operative except in those situations where the choice
is between one of two lives, not between, for example, life and an interest in
property, pride or reputation.1s
13. The law acknowledges that killings in defense of self are not motivated by aggres-
sive instincts out of control but by the ego's self-preservative interests, 'i.e., to keep itself
alive and protect itself from external danger. The ego is moderator between id, superego
and reality demands. Law and its implementation, as viewed by ego, is part of reality. Law
is recognition that id out of control would destroy us as individuals and as a society. Law,
then, as a social control device, rests on the assumption that man's ego and superego need
assistance for the control of ide
14. The assailant is thus assumed not to be deterred by the authorized sanction of deadly
force in self-defense which for some might have a deterrent potenrtial.
15. People V. Tomlins, 213 N.Y. 240, 244, 107 N.E. 496, 498 (1914).
16. 5 WIS'. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, Ope cit. supra note 12, at 45. See State V. Abbott,
36 N.]. 63, 174 A.2d 881 (1961), for discussion of duty to retreat.
17. Application of such a formulation might contribute through time to a redefin~tion
of courage-with running away rather than using deadly force being perceived as a cour-
ageous act. See HARTMANN, PSYCHOANALYSIS AND MORAL VALUES 31-32 (1960).
18. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) provides in pertinent
part:
(b) The use of deadly force is not justifiable ... unless the actor believes that such
force is necessary to protect himself against death, serious bodily harm, kidnapping
or sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat; nor is it justifiable if:
(ii) the actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force with
complete safety by retreating or by surrendering possession of a thing to a person
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With this framework for identifying a need for an exception to criminallia-
bility and for evaluating formulations to meet such a need, we turn to an ex-
amination of the "insanity defense."
Like self-defense, the insanity defense applies, theoretically at least, only to
persons against whom each of the elements of the offense charged could be
established.19 Like defense of self, the defense of insanity, if successfully
pleaded, results in "acquittal."2o But unlike the acquittal of self-defense which
means liberty, the acquittal of the ~nsanity defense means deprivation of liberty
for an indefinite term in a "mental institution."21 And unlike the purpose of
asserting a claim of right thereto or by complying with a demand that he abstain
from any action which he has no duty to take, except that:
(1) the actor is not obliged to retreat from his dwelling or place of work,
unless he was the initial aggressor or is assailed in his place of work by an-
other person whose place of work the actor knows it to be; and ...
(c) Except as required by paragraphs . . . (b), a person employing protective
force may estimate the necessity thereof under the circumstances as he believes them
to be when the force is used, without retreating, surrendering possession, doing any
other act which he has no legal duty to do or abstaining from any lawful action.
For another problem in evaluating the impact of a statute's self-defense formulation
see, e.g., WIse. STAT. ch. 940.05 (1955) :
MANSLAUGHTER. Whoever causes the death of another human being under any of
the following circumstances may be imprisoned not more than 10 years: ...
(2) Unnecessarily, in the exercise of his privilege of self-defense ....
19. See the proposed charge to the jury formulated in Durham v. United States, 214
F.2d 862, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1954) ; People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 726-34, 336 P.2d 492,
498-503 (1959) ; MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). But see note
39 infra and accompanying text.
20. STEPHEN has observed that:
[I] n very ancient times proof of madness appears not to have entitled a man to be
acquitted, at least in case of murder, but to a special verdict that he conlmitted the
offense when mad. This gave him a right to a pardon. The same course was taken
when the defence was killing. by misadventure or in self-defence.
2 STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 151 (1883).
Francis Bacon observed that the Crown, in exercising its· power to pardon,
will spare those only whose case, could it be foreseen, the Law itself may be pre-
sum·ed willing to have excepted out of its general Rules which the Wisdom of Man
cannot possibly make so perfect as to suit every particular Case.
3 BACON, A NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW 802 (1736), reprinted in CRIMINAL LAW at
247.
21. Before 1800 in England, and in most jurisdictions in this country, if an accused
person was found to be irresponsible by reason of insanity he was forthwith acquitted
and no special order looking to his safety or that of society was made. But by the
Criminal Lunatics Act of 1800, the jury, in acquitting such a defendant, accused of
a felony, was required to find specially whether such a person was insane at the time
of the commission of the act, and whether he was acquitted upon that ground. Upon
such a finding, the defendant was committed and detained "during His Majesty's
pleasure."
GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 392-93 (1925).
Similar legislation was enacted by most of the American states soon afterward, al-
though in some stCl:te~ not until a century later.
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self-defense, the purpose of the insanity defense either has been assumed to be
so obvious as not to require articulation or has been expressed in such vague
generalizations as to afford no basis for evaluating the multitude of formulae.
Neither legislative report, nor judicial opinion, nor scholarly comment criti-
cizing or proposing formulations of the insanity defense has faced the crucial
questions: "What is the purpose of the defense in the criminal process?" or
"What need for an exception to criminal liability is being met and what objec-
tives of the criminal law are being reinforced by the defense?"
The Royal Commission on Capital Punishment (1953) disposed of this issue
with apodictic assurance by asserting:
We make one fundamental assumption, which we should hardly have
thought it necessary to state explicitly .... It has for centuries beenrecog-
nized that, if a person was, at the time of his unlawful act, mentally so
disordered that it would be unreasonable to impute guilt to him, he ought
not to be held liable to conviction and punishment under the criminal law.
Views have changed and opinions have differed, as they differ now, about
the standards to be applied in deciding whether" an individual should be
exempted from criminal responsibility for this reason; but the principle
has been accepted without question ....22
Thus the Royal Commission reiterated the well-rounded proposition that "if a
person was ... mentally so disordered that it would be unreasonable to impute
guilt to him, he ought not to be held [guilty, i.e.] liable to conviction and
punishment." The Commission neither sought to identify the purposes of not
imputing guilt to "individuals whose conduct would otherwise be criminal,"23
nor did it ask why and when does the imputation of guilt for being "mentally
so disordered" become "unreasonable." The Commission had no basis for
evaluating the changing views and opinions "about the standards to be applied,"
and the principle "accepted without question" remained without meaning.
A century earlier the pattern had been firmly set of accepting an insanity
defense without asking: "Why an insanity defense?" or more appropriately,
"What objective of the criminal law suggests the need for an exception to the
law's general application-an exception which would require taking into ac-
count the mental health of the offender?" In M'Naghten's Case (1843), the
House of Lords, acting in their judicial, not legislative capacity, asked only
what is the law respecting alleged crimes committed by persons afflicted with
WEIHOFEN, INSANITY AS A DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL LAW 263. See also ide at 262-332
(1933).
For the current situation, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.08 (Proposed Official Draft 1962)
and Comments to § 4.08 at 199-201 (Tent. Draft No.4, 1956) ; Lynch v. Overholser, 369
U.S. 705, 714-20 (1962) ; D.C. CODE § 23-301 (1955); Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d
862, 876 n.57 (D.C. eire 1954) ; and Goldstein, J. & Katz, Dangerousness and Mental Ill-
ness-Some Observations On the Decision to Release Persons Acquitted By Reason of
Insanity, 70 YALE L.]. 225 (1960) ; and see notes 45 & 48 infra.
ZZ. ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 1949-1953 REPORT CMD. J8932, at
98 (1953).
23. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, Comment at 156-60 (Tent. Draft No.4, 1956).
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"insane delusions."24 And the innovating court in Durham (1954), after pro-
mulgating a new formulation gave no guide to evaluating its adequacy beyond
noting:
Our collective conscience does not allow punishment where it cannot
impose blame ....
The legal and moral traditions of the western world require that those
who, of their own free will and with evil intent (sometinles called mens
rea) , commit acts which violate the law, shall be criminally responsible for
those acts. Our traditions also require that where such acts stern from and
are the product of a mental disease or defect . . . moral blame shall not
attach, and hence there will not be criminal responsibility ....25
The court leaves without definition and without identification of purpose such
ambiguous words as "punishment," and "blame,"26 and thus in effect only says
"he who is punishable is blameworthy and he who is blameworthy is punish-
able." Never established is the relevance of these words to a defense which
would compel supposedly different dispositions of persons involved in activity
labeled "criminal." Moreover, the court, though not blinded by precedent, left
unasked and therefore unanswered: "What underlies the 'legal and moral tradi-
tions' in 'our collective conscience' which prevents us from inquiring why a rule
is required?"
Likewise, the American Law Institute (1956-1962) provides no basis for
evaluating its formula for a defense of insanity.27 With focus on consequences,
24. [T] 0 establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that,
at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused waS' labouring under
such a defect of reasot1l, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and
quality of the act he was doing; or if he did know it, that he did not know he was
doing what was wrong.
Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 4 St. Tr. N.S. 847, 931,8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L. 1843).
25. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 876 (D.C. eire 1954).
[A] n accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of
mental disease or mental defect.
We use "disease" in the sense of a condition which is considered capable of either
improving or deteriorating. We use "defect" in the sense of a condition which is not
considered capable of either improving or deteriorating and which may be either
congenital, or the result of injury or the residual effect of a physical or mental dis-
ease.
Id. at 874-75.
26. In all civilized communities, ancient or modern, some forms of insanity have been
regarded as exempting from the punishment of crime, and under some circumstances
at least, as vitiating the civil acts of those who are affected with it. The only diffi-
culty, or diversity of opinion consists in determining who are really insane, in the
meaning of the law ....
RAY, A TREATISE ON THE MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY 2 (4th ed. 1860).
27. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) provides:
( 1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct
as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appre-
ciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law.
(2) As used in this Article, the terms "mental disease or defect" do not include
an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct.
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it "explains," echoing the Royal Commission and Durham, that the purpose of
the insanity defense is "to discriminate between the cases where a punitive-
correctional disposition is appropriate and those in which a medical-custodial
disposition is the only kind that the law should allow."28 Once ((punitive" is sub-
stituted for ((custodial" and ((correctional" for ((medical," or however the terms
are juxtaposed in the ALI statement, the "distinctions" seem to disappear.29
Moreover, criteria for evaluating what constitutes an "appropriate" disposition
for either category remain unarticulate. Thus those characteristics which deter-
mine who is to fit into which category remain unidentified. This may be be-
cause the distinctions between alternative responses are never clarified. Finally,
a Comm~ttee of distinguished doctors, lawyers and religious leaders, appointed
In conflict with the exclusion in (2), the chief reporter of the Model Penal Code has said:
[T]he category of the irresponsible must be defined in extreme terms. The problem
is to differentiate between the wholly non-deterrable and persons who are more or
less susceptible to influence by law. (Emphasis supplied.)
Wechsler, The Critert·a of Criminal Responsibility, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 367,374 (1955). How
to select from the non-deterrables who have committed a crime those non--deterrables who
are to be relieved of criminal responsibility is not clarified by the Model Penal Code's
exclusion from the term "mental disease or defect ... an abnormality manifested only by
repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct."
In criticizing this exclusion in the Model Penal Code, the Califorma's SPECIAL COM-
MISSIONS ON INSANITY AND CRIMINAL OFFENDERS, FIRST REPORT (July 7, 1962) has
warned that:
The law, whether judicial or statutory, must avoid accepting a psychiatric label or
classification as determinative of the question of responsibility for all future cases.
In every case whether or not a defendant has a mental disorder and the manner in
which the mental disorder affected his ability to control his conduct is, and properly
should be, a question of fact. Furthermore, we find it difficult to conceive of a case
involving a mentally disordered defendant where the H only" evidence of that mental
disorder is the defendant's repeated criminal conduct. Moreover, the fact that a
defendant is a repeated offender is sometimes the best evidence that he is unable to
conform his conduct to the law and it seems paradoxical to say that this evidence
is insufficient to justify such a finding.
Id. at 27. See also Currens v. United States., 290 F.2d 751, 761-63 (3d Cir. 1961).
28. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, Comment at 156 (Tent. Draft No.4, 1956).
29. Similar confusion in judicial reasoning is reflected in the following statement:
Two policies underly [sic] the distinction in treatment between the responsible and
the non-responsible: (1) It is both wrong and foolish to punish where there is no
blame and where punishment cannot correct. (2) The community's security may be
better protected by hospitalization ... than by imprisonment.
Williams v. United States, 250 F.2d 19, 25-26 (D.C. Cir. 1957). (Emphasis supplied.)
"Punish" and "punishment" are used in policy statement "(1)" to suggest different
underlying meanings or coocepts. The word is first used as a symbol of the vengeance
or retribution function of the criminal law and then used as a symbol of the rehabili-
tation function. Query: If "punishment," however defined, were an effective re-
habilitative device would the court find its use obj ectionable even if blameworthiness
could not be established? Is involuntary confinement for an indefinite period' in a
mental hospital any less a deprivation, as the court seems to imply in policy state-
ment "(2)," than involuntary confinement for a limited period in prison?
Goldstein, J., Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility De-
cisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.]. 543, 546 (1960).
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by the ·Governor of New York (1958) to improve the defense of insanity, pro-
nounced before formulating their rule:
We are unanimously of the view that there are compelling practical,
ethical and religious reasons for maintaining the insanity defense; . . . .
We believe ... that it is entirely feasible· to cast a formulation which . . .
will sufficiently improve the statute to meet working standards of good
morals, good science, and good law.so
Never identified are the reasons labeled "practical," "ethical," and "religious,"
or the standards labeled "good morals," "good science" and "good law."
In enunciating yet another formula for insanity, the Court of Appealsfor the
Third Circuit in United States v. Currens (1961) contaminates its thinking
by confusing and merging the inherently incompatible concepts of "insanity"
as a defense to a crime with "insanity" as evidence to cast doubt on a material
'element of an offense. It suggests, as did the court in Durham, that some
relationship exists between the insanity defense and mens rea, a material ele-
ment of every major crime. In Currens, mens rea (guilty mind) is \1sed to
mean that criminal liability rests
... on the assumption that a person has a capacity to control his be-
havior and to choose between alternative courses of conduct. ... When· a
person possessing capacity for choice and control, nevertheless breaches a
duty ... he is subjected to ... sanctions not because of the act alone, but
because of his failure to exercise his capacity to control .... For example,
an act of homicide will create no liability, only civil liability or varying
criminallia:bility depending on the nature of the mental concomitant of the
act. Generally the greater the defendant's capacity for control of his con-
duct and the more clearly it appears that he exercised his power of choice
in acting, the more severe is the penalty imposed by society.sl
And the court criticized the Durham andMJNaghten formulae because:
They do not take account of the fact that an "insane" defendant commits
the crime not because his mental illness causes him to do a certain pro-
hibited act but because the totality of his personality is such, because of
mental illness, that he has lost the capacity to control his acts in the way
that the normal individual can and does control them. If this effect has
taken place he must be found not to possess the guilty mind, the mens rea,
necessary to constitute his prohibited act a crime.S2
30. REPORT OF THE GOVERNORS COMMITTEE ON THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY 140 N.Y.L.].
No. 88, p. 4 (Nov. 5, 1958), No. 89, p. 4 (Nov. 6, 1958) (emphasis supplied).
The Committee proposed:
(1) A person may not be convicted of a crime for which he is not responsible.
(2) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such con-
duct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity:
(a) to know or appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct; or
(b) to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.
(3) The terms "mental disease or defect" do not include an abnormality mani-
fested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct.
Cf. note 27 supra.
31. United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 773 (3d Cir. 1961).
32. Id. at 774 (emphasis supplied).
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At this point the court by the force of its own reasoning should have been led
to say:
Without· the essential element of mens rea, there is no crime from which
to relieve the defendant of liability and consequently, since no crime has
been committed, there is no need for formulating an insanity defense.33
But instead the court actually concludes:
We are of the opinion that the following [insanity] formula most nearly
fulfills the objectives just discussed ....34
The court uses the word "crime" first to mean "dangerous conduct" and then,
without alerting itself to the shift, to mean technically the establishment beyond
doubt of each material element of an offense. With this sleight of thought the
court. shifts focus from "insanity" as a defense to conduct "otherwise criminal"
to insanity as evidence to negate an element essential to categorizing the ac-
cused's conduct "crimina1."
In announcing a new formula for the insanity defense, the court fails to
recognize that there is no need for such a defense to remove criminal liability
since it has concluded that no crime is established once mental illness (how-
ever defined) has cast doubt on mens rea (however defined). Conceptually, at
least, outright acquittal would result and instructions to the jury would reflect
a time, pre-M'N agk-ten, when evidence of mental· condition, like any other
relevant evidence, was used to cast doubt on a material element of the crime.35
33. It is of the utmost importance for the protection of the liberty of the subject that
a court should always bear in mind that, unless a statute, either clearly or by neces-
sary implication, rules out mens rea as a constituent part of a crime the Court should
not find a man guilty of an offense against the criminal law unless he has a guilty
mind..
Lord Goddard, C.]. in Brend v. Wood. L 62 T.L.R:. 462, 463 (1946), quoted with approval
in Lim Chin Aik v. Reginam, 1 All. E.R. 223, 228 (1963).
34. 290 F.2d at 774. For its test the court proposed:
The jury must be satisfied that at the time of committing the prohibited act the
defendant, as· a result of mental disease or defect, lacked substantial capacity to con-
form his conduct to the requirements of the law which he is alleged to have violated.
Ibid.
35. As early as 1724, Justice Tracy, instructing the jury on "guilty mind" as a requisite
element of murder in the Trial of Edward Arnold said:
[T]he shooting ... for which prisoner is indicted, is proved beyond all manner of
contradiction; but whether this shooting was malicious, that depends upon the sanity
of the man. That he shot, and that wilfully [is proved]; but whether maliciously,
that is the thing; that "is the question; whether this man hath the use of his reason
and sense? . . . [G] uilt arises from the mind, and the wicked will and intention of
the man. If a man be deprived of his reason, and consequently of his intention, he
cannot be guilty; and if that be the case, though he had actually killed . . . he is
exempted from punishment: punishment is intended for example, and to deter other
persons from wicked design-s; but the punishment of a madman~ a person that hath
no design, can have no· example.
16 State Trials 596, 764 (1724). The paragraph goes on to construe narrowly the kind of
evidence which might negative.. "guilty ·mind.;"
On the other side, we must be very cautious; it is not every frantic and idle humour
of a man, that will exempt him from justice, and the punishment of the law. When
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In our efforts to understand the suggested relationship between "insanity"
and ((mens rea)} there emerges a purpose for the "insanity defense" which,
though there to be seen, has remained of extremely low visibility. That purpose
seems to be obscured because th~nking about such a relationship has general-
ly been blocked by unquestioning and disarming references to our collective
conscience and our religious and moral traditions. Assuming the existence of
the suggested relationship between "insanity" and U mens rea,}} the defense is
not to absolve of criminal responsibility "sick" persons who would otherwise
be subject to criminal sanction. Rather, its real function is to authorize the
state to hold those "who must be found not to possess the guilty mind mens
rea,"36 even though the criminal law demands that no person be held criminally
responsible if doubt is cast on any material elenlent of the offense charged.87
This, in some jurisdictions, is found directly reflected in evidentiary rules mak-
ing inadmissible testimony on mental health to disprove a state of mind neces-
sary to constitute the crime charged.88 A more dramatic expression of abandon-
ing the rule of proof of each element beyond a reasonable doubt has slipped
into those instructions to the jury which advise the ordering of deliberations:
If you find the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity, you will ren-
der a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.
If you do not so find, then you will proceed to determine whether he is
guilty or innocent of one or both of the offenses charged on the basis of the
same act.
[T]here are two principal issues for you to determine. The first is his
nlental condition and the second is whether he committed the offenses
charged or whether he is innocent of them....
a man is guilty of a great offense, it must be very plain and clear, before a man is
allowed such an exemption; therefore it is not every kind of frantic humour or
something unaccountable in a man's actions, that points him out to be such a mad-
man as is to be exempted from punishment: it must be a man that is totally deprived
of his understanding and m,emory, and doth not know what he is' doing, no more
than an infant, than a brute, or a wild beast, such a one is never the object of punish-
ment; .••
Id. at 764-65. See note 21 supra on such acquittals being accompanied by release not re-
straint and note 45 infra on the confusion over the consequences in the federal system.
36. The court comes close to acknowledging this in United States v. Currens, 290
F.2d 751, 767 (1961). "The throwing of the mentally ill individual from the jail back into
the community, untreated and uncured, presents a great and immediate danger."
37. See the excellent article Silving, Mental Incapacity in Criminal Law, 2 CURRENT
LAW AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS 1 (1961): "Were the assertion that insanity excludes intent
taken seriously, no plea of insanity would be necessary. Yet it is required in our law."
Id. at 13.
38. For differing views of this issue see Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 473 n.12
(1946) ; State v. Fuller, 229 So. C. 439, 444, 93 S.E.2d 463, 466 (1956) ; State v. Di Paolo,
34 N.]. 279,168 A.2d401, 409-10 (1961) ; and MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.02 (Proposed Official
Draft 1962) providing:
( 1) Evidence that the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect is admis-
sible whenever it is relevant to prove that the defendant did or did not have a state
of mind which is an element of the offense.
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Now, on the issue of guilt or innocence of .the offenses charged, the
essential elements of the first count or the housebreaking count, if you do
not find the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity, are as follows:
First, that the defendant broke and entered or entered without breaking
. . . the place described in the indictment;
Second, that the place entered was occupied or belonged to the complain-
ing witness; and,
Third, that he intended to steal or comnlit the offense of larceny ....39
Yet, since a verdict of not guilty results in outright release and a verdict of not
guilty by reason of insanity results in incarceration, jury instructions must
require first a determination of innocence or guilt and second a consideration
of the insanity issue only after a determination that guilt can be established.40
What this discussion indicates, then, is that the insanity defense is not de-
signed, as is the defense of self-defense, to define an exception to criminal
liability, but rather to define for sanction an exception from among those who
would be free of liability. It is as if the insanity defense were prompted by an
affirmative answer to the silently posed question: "Does mens rea or any
essential element of an offense exclude from liability a group of persons whom
the community wishes to restrain?" If the suggested relationship between mens
rea and "insanity" means that "insanity" precludes proof beyond doubt of mens
rea then the "defense" is designed to authorize the holding of persons who have
committed no crime. So conceived, the problem really facing the criminal proc-
ess has been how to obtain authority to sanction the "insane" who would be
excluded from liability by an overall application of the general principles of the
criminal law.
Furthermore, even if the relationship between insanity and ""mens rea" is re-
jected, this same purpose re-emerges when we try to understand why the con-
sequence of this defense, unlike other defenses, is restraint, not release. Even
though each of the elements of an offense may be established, release will follow
39. Durham v. United States, Record on Retrial under the new rule-reprinted in
CRIMINAL LAW at 775-76 (emphasis supplied).
Reflecting the same confused view about insanity and its relationship to criminal intent
is the concept of diminished responsibility which in capital cases provides:
[I]f the jury found (1) that the accused suffered from a mental disorder not amount-
ing to insanity sufficient to excuse him from criminal responsibility ... and (2) that
such mental disorder deprived him of the requisite "sound memory and discretion"
essential for conviction of first degree murder, it could convict him of the lesser
crime of second degree murder.
In Stewart v. United States, 214 F.2d 879, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1954), the court rejected this
concept.
If the mental elements of an offense must be proven beyond doubt there would be no
need for a concept of diminished responsibility.
But see note 19 supra and accompanying text.
40. Under a bifurcated trial system an accused must be found guilty before the insanity
defense can be invoked and evidence of mental health is admissible to prove or disprove
elements of the offense charged. People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 336 P.2d 492 (1959).
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acquittal or dismissal if, for example, entrapment,41 self-defense,42 or the stat-
ute of limitations 48 are successfully pleaded. Assuming, then, that all elements
of an offense are to be established before the insanity defense becomes opera-
tive, the question remains: "Why restrain rather than release?" Restraint
cannot be attributed to potential "dangerousness" associated with the crime
charged, no matter how serious, for that kind of "dangerousness" is charac-
teristic of defendants whose defenses prevail.44 The crucial variable leading to
restraint seems to be the "insanity at the time of the offense," i.e., a fear of
danger seen in the combination of "mental sickness" and "crime." This fear of
freedom for those acquitted by 'reason of insanity comes sharply into focus at
the close of the Currens decision. The court, uncertain of the consequences of
such an acquittal for federal offenses outside of the District of Columbia, warns,
in reversing the judgment of conviction: "[W] e are concerned with the dis-
position of Currens should he be found not guilty by reason of insanity . . . .
In any event [in the light of doubt about the appropriate federal procedure for
commitment] should Currens be acquitted at his new trial, the federal authori-
ties should bring him and his condition to the attention of State authorities to
the end that he may not remain in a position in which he may be a danger to
himself or to the public."45 That mandatory commitment, not release, general-
41. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958)
. . . If [the defendant] is to be relieved from the usual punitive consequences, it is
on no account because he is innocent of the offense described. . . .
The courts refuse to. convict an entrapped defendant not because his, conduct falls
outside the proscription of the statute, but because, even if his guilt be admitted, the
methods employed on behalf of the Government to bring about conviction cannot be
countenanced.
Id. at 380.. (Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurring.) 'And see Donnelly, Judicial Control of
Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons and Agent Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091, 1098-1115
(1951).
42. See notes 7-18 supra and accompanying text.
43. See Note, The Statute 0/ Limitations in Criminal Law: A Penetrable Barrier to
Prosecution, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 630 (1954).
44. On the presumption of innocence and the maxim that it is better to let a guilty 'man
escape than to condemn an innocent one see BENTHAM, A TREATISE ON JUDICIAL EVIDENCE
196-98 (1825). The other side of thepresumption-of-innocence coin is proof beyond reason-
able doubt as a requisite to criminal liability. See Curley v. United States, 160 F.2d 229
(D.C. Cir. 1947). On the duty of the police not to enforce the substantive law of crimes
unless the criminal process can be invoked within: bounds set by constitution, statute, and
court decisions see Goldstein, J., Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process:
Low Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 554-62 (1962).
45. United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 757, 776 (3d Cir. 1961) :
Courts of appeals have differed in their views as to available procedure in the
event that a person is found not guilty of a federal criminal charge by reason of in-
sanity. See Pollard v. United States, 6 Cir. 282, F.2d 450, 464, Order of Issuance of
New Mandate, 6 Cir. 1960, 285 F.2d 81 ... , but compare Sauer v. United States,
9 Cir. 1957, 241 F.2d 640, 651.;.52 n.32.•..
Earlier in its· opinion the court quotes with approval from BIGGS, THE GUILTY MIND
144-45 (1955):
[T] he mental competency of recedivists should be questioned by realistic means
at the earliest possible stage. So long as courts judge criminal responsibility by the
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ly follows the ~nsanity defense becomes then particularly striking since, to the
extent "insanity at the time. of the offense" is related to "mental health at the
time of acquittal," the state is authorized to select from the mentally ill those
test of knowledge of right and wrong, psychotics who have served prison terms or
are granted probations are released to commit increasingly serious crimes, repeating
crime and incarceration and release until murder is committed. Instead of being
treated as ordinary criminals, they should be confined to institutions for the insane
at the first offense and not be released until or unless cured.
Id. at 767.
Similarly this fear coupled with the possibility of an ironic twist prompts Judge Hastie
in his dissent in Currens to note:
If we should affirm the judgmem below, as I think we conscientiously can, the
result of appellant's conviction and the consequent invocation of the Youth Correction
Act would be his confinement for an appropriate period in a psychiatric institution
for such treatment and supervision as are best calculated, in the light of our present
medical knowledge, to accomplish his rehabilitation and cure. On the record this
result would be good for the appellant and good for society. On the other hand, as
the majority opinion recognizes, it is doubtful whether the federal authorities could
require the restraint and psychiatric treatment of the appellant if he should be retried
and, by reason of his mental illness, found not guilty. I think we need not and, there-
fore, should not thus risk the release of one found to be a criminal psychopath when
restraint and treatment seem desirable both medically and socially.
For these reasons I would affirm the conviction and commitment of the appellant
Also see dissent of Justice Clark in Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 720,735 (1961).
[A] person who has been shown to have committed an act resulting in serious
harm to a member of the community, and who is also shown to be irresponsible by
reason of mental disorder, ought to be the object of an even more thorough-going
inquiry as to his risk to society than the responsible offender. This is so, of course,
because by definition such a person lacks the capacity for individual self-control that
is ultimately society's most secure protection.
State of California, SPECIAL COMMISSIONS ON INSANITY AND CRIMINAL OFFENDERS,
FIRST REpORT 31 (July 7, 1962).
This report comes close to verbalizing the fears and concerns of the community and
attempts to resolve or gives the appearance of resolving the conflict between relieving a
person of criminal liability and compulsorily holding him for care and custody as a mentally
ill person in a maximum security unit of the correctional system by separating, as if they
were clearly separable, a finding of no criminal responsibility from its consequences, which
is a special hearing for such acquittals, not all acquittals, to determine· present dangerous-
ness. It suggests
that the defendant alleged to be metlltally ill presents two questions: First, whether
he ought to be condemned by a criminal conviction, and second, whether he is such
a substantial risk to the public safety that he must be securely confined.
Id. at 20.
Since the question of criminal responsibility is a legal question, the ultimate decision
in a particular case is properly to be made by the judicial system and not by the
medical profession.
Id. at 21.
Upon finding that a defendant is not criminally responsible for the act with which
he is charged, an inquiry immediately ought to be made whether he is a substantial
present risk to the safety of the public. The inquiry should be squarely directed to
the question of whether the defendant is dangerous. This is a different question
than whether he is "insane" \vithin the meaning of the rules defining his account-
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who require civil restraint for custody and care. Thus the insanity defense is
not a defense, it is a device for triggering indeterminate restraint.
The real problem which continues to face legislators, judges, jurors, and
commentators is how to restrain persons who are somehow feared as both
crazed and criminal. This oft-unconscious fear has precluded thinking about
"insanity" in terms of traditional principles of law, whether that "insanity" is
conceptualized as doubt-casting evidence or as an independent defense. Though
unpleasant to acknowledge, the insanity defense is an expression of uneasiness,
conscious or unconscious, either about the adequacy of such material elements
of an offense as ((mens rea" and "voluntariness" as bases for singling out those
who ought to be held criminally responsible, or it is an expression of concern
about the adequacy of civil commitment procedures to single out from among
the "not guilty by reason of insanity" those who are mentally ill and in need of
restraint.
The problem of "whether there should be an insanity defense" or "how to
formulate it" must continue unresolved as long as largely unconscious feelings
of apprehension, awe, and anger toward the "sick," particularly if associated
with "criminality," are hidden by.the more acceptable conscious desire to pro-
tect the "sick from criminal liability." What must be recognized is the enor-
mous ambivalence toward the "sick"46 reflected in conflicting wishes to excul-
ability under the criminal law. If he appears to be dangerous, he should be committed
to secure custody. And he should be so committed without regard to whether he is
"psychotic," whether he "knows right from wrong" or, indeed, whether he is effec-
tively treatable by presently developed therapeutic techniques. The point is that he
is dangerous and should not be let loose on society.
Id. at 31.
Similarly,
The only proper verdict is one which ensures that the person who suffers from the
disease is kept secure in a hospital so as not to be a danger to himself or others.
That is, a verdict of guilty but insane.
Bratty v. Att'y-Gen. for N. Ireland, [1961] 3 All E.R. 523, 533 (H.L.).
For the purposes of the criminal law there are two categories of mental irrespon-
sibility, one where the disorder is due to disease and the other where it is not. The
distinction is not an arbitrary one. If disease is not the cause, if there is some
temporary loss of consciousness arising accidentally, it is reasonable to hope that it
will not be repeated and that it is safe to let an acquitted man go entirely free. But
if disease is present the same thing may happen again, and therefore, since 1800, the
law has provided that persons acquitted on this ground should be subject to restraint.
The acquittal is now given in the illogical and disagreeable form of the verdict,
"Guilty but insane" . . . .
Hill v. Baxter, [1958] 1 Q.B. 277, 285-86 (1957) (CA). See note 48 infra.
46. For an idealized sociological perception of the sick, see PARSONS, THE SOCIAL
SYSTEM 436-37 (1951). On the confusion between "sick" and "criminal" in literature and
law, see CRIMINAL LAW 253-83; see also Goldstein, ]. & Katz, Dangerousness and Mental
Illness: Some Observations on the Decision to Release Persons Acquitted by Reason of
Insanity, 70 YALE L.]. 225 (1960).
The writer [in 1945] heard state hospital doctors frankly admit that the animals of
near-by piggeries were better fed, housed and treated than many of the patients in
their wards. He saw hundreds of sick people shackled, strapped, strait-jacketed and
bound to their beds; he saw mental patients forced to eat meals with their hands
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pate and to blame; to sanction and not to sanction; to degrade and to elevate;
to stigmatize and not to stigmatize; to care and to reject; to treat and to mis-
treat; to protect and to destroy.47 Such ambivalence finds expression in legis-
lative proposals that persons acquitted by reason of insanity be "committed to
the custody of the commissioner of correction [not mental health] to be placed
in an appropriate institution of the department of correction [not mental health]
for custody, care, and treatment."48 And such ambivalence has blinded 49 law-
because there were not enough spoons and other tableware to go around-not be-
cause they could not be trusted to eat like humans. He saw them crawl into beds
jammed close together, in dormitories filled to twice or three times their normal
capacity. He saw, in institution after institution, cold unappetizing food placed before
patients at mealtime-food that patients either wolfed down to get the ordeal over
quickly or else left untouched.
He saw black eyes and bruises which were reported to the writer to have been
received at the hands of fellow patients or attendants. He saw court records and
hospital accident lists indicating that brutality against patients, while not as common
as occasional newspaper exposes might suggest, was of shocking frequency. Occa-
sional accounts of fatal beatings of mental patients attested to the end-results of
some of this treatment.
DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA 449 (2d ed. 1949).
47. '[A]mbivalen~e: love and hatred directed toward the same person at the same time.
Ambivalence, which is due to the dual orientation of man as an individual and as a
member of society, is universal. In fact, the more one loves another, the more the
narcissistic nucleus of the personality hates the loved object. Under normal condi-
tions, however, one of these attitudes is deeply buried. This is intelligible, because
there is perhaps no more perplexing situation than to hate whom you love or' to love
whom you hate.... In ordinary life the repressed hatred of a person one loves may
break through when one feels betrayed by him.
ALEXANDER, FUNDAMENTALS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 107-08 (1948).
48. Report of the Governor's Committee on the Defense of Insanity, 140 N.Y.L.J. 4
(Nov. 5, 6, 1958).
In extreme cases, such as that of the homicidal offender, the security required must
exceed that required for even the most dangerous convict. . . . [W] e recommend
that the dangerous offender who has been acquitted by reason of mental disorder
should be placed in the custody of the Department of Corrections at one of its medi-
cal facilities.
State of California SPECIAL COMMISSION ON INSANITY AND CRIMINAL OFFENDERS, FIRST
REpORT 34 (July 7,1962). See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.08 (Tent. Draft No.4) provid-
ing commitment of persons acquitted by reason of insanity "to the custody of the Com-
missioner of Correction" or alternatively to the Commissioner of Mental Hygiene or Public
Health. The official draft eliminates commitment to the Commissioner of Correction. MODEL
PENAL CODE § 4.08 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
Label the judicial process as one will, no resort to subtlety can refute the fact that
the power to imprison is a criminal sanction. To view otherwise is self-delusion.
Courts should not, ostrichlike, bury their heads in the sand.
City of Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 174, 323 P .2d 614, 617 (1958).
Report of Commissioners Appointed Under a Resolve of the Legislature of Massachu-
setts, to Superintend the Erection of a Lunatic Hospital at Worcester and to Report a
System of Discipline and Government for the Same. SEN. Doc. No.2, Jan. 4, 1832, pp. 22,
23:
[The insane] ... should be treated, not with a sole regard to the security of others,
but with special reference also to their own misfortunes, and in a maooer to shorten
their duration, or where that is impossible, at least to mitigate their severity.
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makers to their tampering, via the insanity defense, with fundamentalprin.:.
ciples on which their authority to impose criminal liability presently rests. By
obfuscating the· function of the defense in terms of the ethical and religious
values of Western civilization to care for .the "sick," lawmakers _have not
only misled themselves but psychiatrists as well who, confused by their own
ambivalence, have willingly, defiantly, unquestioningly, or with misgivings,
joined in these deliberations. Psychiatrists have participated in the process
\vithout identifying the role they nlust play and without forcing the process to
clarify that role.50 The plea to care for the "sick" muffles the call to segregate
the "dangerous" whom the criminal law can not hold. With the real problenl
so disguised, the fruitless and frequent searches for new fornlulae and the frus-
trating and fighting exchanges between law and psychiatry become somewhat
understandable. Thus, another low visibility purpose of the insanity defense
emerges. That purpose is to keep sufficiently ambiguous the consequences of
the defense, whatever the formula, so as to prevent at least conscious recog-
nition that the prerequisites of criminal liability have been aballdoned.51
Lawmakers could decide to implement any or all of these now -visible pur-
poses. Provisions could be drafted to restrain: (1) .persons charged with a
crime who are feared to be dangerous and/or felt to need care anddestigmati-
In view of these facts and considerations, the Com-missioners cannot hesitate to
recommend, that as soon as the Hospital at Worcester shall be prepared for the
reception of the insane . . . all orders, decrees and sentences for the confinement of
any lunatic, made by any Court . . . shall be so far modified, that said lunatics shall
be committed to the custody of the Superintendent of the Hospital at Worcester,
instead of being committed to any Jail or House of Correction, as heretofore re-
quired: and, furthermore, that all lunatics, who at the time when such proclamation
is made, shall be confined in any Jail or House of Correction, under any order,
sentence or decree of any Court, or any judicial officers, shall as soon as convenient
and practicable, be removed to said Hospital . . . .
reprinted in CRIMINAL LAW at 266.
On the situation in Massachusetts 125 years later so far as it concerns special custodial
facilities for the "criminally insane" or the "insane criminal" who have been found incom-
petent to stand trial or who have been relieved of criminal liability see COMMONWEALTH
OF MASSACHUSETTS, GOVERNOR'S COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE MASSACHUSETTS CORRECTIONAL
SYSTEM, SECOND REPORT 47 (1956) :
The level of care is so low . . . that one is forced to conclude that Massachusetts is
willing to abandon almost 1,000 persons who would, if not criminal or difficult to
handle, be receiving the best medical care the Commonwealth can provide.
49. In psychoanalysis, this would be called denial.
"[D]enial" refers ... to the blocking of certain sense impressions from the outside
world. If they are not actually denied access to consciousness, they at least have as
little attention paid to them as possible and· the painful consequences of their pres-
ence are partly nullified.
BRENNER, AN ELEMENTARY TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 100-01 (1955).
50. See Goldstein, J. & Katz, Dangerousness and Mental Illness: Some Observations
on the Decision to Release Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 70 YALE L.J. 225,
230-31 (1960).
51. People v. Nash, 52 Cal. App. 2d 36, 52, 53, 338 P.2d 416, 426-27 (1959) .
. . . excepting only in cases where the death penalty may be imposed, it is relatively
unimportant to society and to the accused whether the determination as to criminal
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zation because of a suspicion of criminality coupled with a finding of mental
sickness; (2) persons acquitted outright of a crime who are feared to be dan-
gerous and/or felt to need care and destigmatization because of criminality
coupled with a finding of mental sickness; .and (3) persons who have com-
mitted 52 a crime and are feared to be dangerous and/or felt to need care and
destigmatization because of criminality coupled with a finding of mental sickness.
In promulgating such provisions, answers are required to a series of questions
(set forth in the Epilogue) which must be consciously posed about restraint
-restraint in what kind of an institution and for how long; restraint for
what crimes- and for what mental illnesses; and restraint at whose initiative
and at what stage in the process.53 In responding to these questions lawmakers
will be pouring meaning into Hthe fear of dangerousness," Hthe need for care,"
and the "need for destigmatization." And if obfuscating developments are to
be avoided, -lawmakers not only must acknowledge wishes to neglect, stigma-
tize,·punish and destroy, but they must also consider the extent to which these
wishes are to be realized through restraint. Awareness that such wishes con-
stantly press for satisfaction in conflict with preferred goals should stimulate
the development of formulations and procedures designed to maximize con-
sciously thought-through preferences and to deflect those conflicting and other-
wise unconscious wishes which might gain satisfaction under cover of these
preferences.M The operational· significance of key phrases in any formulation
will thus be shaped and joined by the values to be preferred.
responsibility insofar as it may rest on the issue of sanity is made at the time of
initi~l trial or later. The immediately important question for both the state and the
defendant is this: Did the defendant commit the act charged? If he committed it, sane
or insane, he should be held under restraints adequate and appropriate to the cir-
cumstances. If the circumstances require actual confinement it is not at the moment
important what name be applied to the institution. The character of the supervision
and study to be given the accused is important.
Similarly in relation to so-called sex psychopath statutes:
~ .. The main purpose of the Act [though civil in nature] is to protect society against
the activities of sexual psychopaths. The secondary purpose is to rehabilitate the
sexual psychopath . . . .
The emphasis that appellant places on the fact that he ... now finds himself in San
Quentin, possibly for life, is misplaced. This argument would be sound only were
his confinement punishment. As we have already seen, the purpose of the confinement
is to prot~ct society and to try and cure the accused.
The arguments of appellant are without merit. The order appealed from is affirmed.
People v. Levy, 151 Cal. App. 2d 460, 311 P.2d 897 (1957). But see In re Maddox, 351
Mich. 358,88 N.W.2d 470 (1957), and note 48 supra.
52. The word "committed" is used rather than convicted so as to leave open for decision
the question of· the stage or stages of the process at which the issue may be raised. See
Epilogue.
53. In determining criteria for restraint, criteria for the release of persons so re-
strained would -likewise have to be established. Any change of circumstance removing a
crucial criterion of restraint would result in release. See Goldstein, J. & Katz, supra note
50.
54. The world about us is much richer in meanings. than we cotllSciously see. These
meanings are continually cutting across our ostensible criteria of judgment, arid
872 THE YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 72 :853
But such efforts by lawmakers to formulate an exception to criminal liability
would be premature and may prove unnecessary. More appropriately· they
should consider abolition of the insanity defense,55 and examine "voluntariness"
and ((mens rea" as requisites of criminal liability. Enormous confusion about
the tneanings of these concepts in the definition of offenses and their construe...
tion by the courts suggests that there will be great difficulty in establishing the
purposes of these material elements as devices for sorting out. those to be or
not to be subject to criminal sanction.56 The need for such concepts must be
examined in terms of the overall objectives oLa law of crimes. Furthermore,
abolition of the "insanity defense" should. force· focus on the why and the ade-
quacy of criteria for civil commitment and discharge of the "mentally:ill." The
question underlying each of these examinations nlust be:· "Who are to remain
free of state intervention; .who ought to be restrained, and for what purposes ?"
Ultimately this requires c0111ing to terms with such etnotionally-freighted con-
cepts as "blame," "choice," "free will," "capacity-to-control," and "determin-
ism," all of which, in the criminal law, have remained slogans of exhortation
beyond the reach of definition. Will such explorations lead to an insanity de-
fense? If they do, we must know 'lvhy.
EPILOGUE
To illustrate the kinds of questions that the legislator or judge would have to
pose and answer in promulgating and implementing any or all of the purposes
identified, the third statement of purpose is analyzed. It calls for:
compulsively distorting the operations of the mind whose quest for an objective view
of reality is consciously quite sincere. Good intentions are not enough to widen the
sphere of self-mastery. There must be a special technique for the· sake of exposing
the hidden meanings which operate to bind and cripple the processes of logical
thought. With practice one nlay wield the tool of free-fantasy with .such ruthless
honesty that relevant Inaterial comes very quickly to the focus of attention which
we call "waking consciousness."
LASSWELL, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND POLITICS 36 (1960). See also FRANK, LAW AND THE
MODERN MIND 22-31 (1949). Various defense mechanisms may interfere with awareness,
for example, rationalization.
Rationalization means selecting the most acceptable from a complex of mixed motives
to explain behavior. This permits the repression of other alien motives. Since the
selected motives are suitable to the act, the unacceptable oneS' may be overlooked or
denied. It is by no meanS' correct to define rationalization as the invention of neces-
S'arily nonexistent nlotives ; it is usually an arbitrary selection which passes speciously
for the whole.
ALEXANDER, FUNDAMENTALS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 109 (1948).
55. On abolishing the insanity defense as a violation of a state constitution because
"the mininluln requirements of mens rea have been held to compel it." See State v.White,
- Wash. -, 374 P.2d 942, 965 (1962), construing State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. .106, ·110
Pac. 1020 (1910). Also see GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 466-70
(1925) .
56. On "voluntartness" and mens rea and the accompanying confusion see cases and,
materials reprinted in CRIMINAL LAW 524-600. For an interesting examination of 11z.ensrea
see Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 Supreme Court Review 107 (1962).
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... the restraint of persons who have con'tmitted a crime and are feared
to be dangerous and/or felt to need care and destigmatization because of
criminality coupled with a finding of mental sickness.57
Any formulation and provision for its invocation and implementation would
require answers to a series of questions which .might be posed about restraint.
In terms of the fear of dangerousness, of the need for care, and of the need for
destigmatization, these questions focus on restraint in what kinds of institutions
and. for how long; restraint for what crimes and for what mental sicknesses;
and restraint. at whose initiative and at what stages in the process:
A. Restraint in what k~nds of institutions?
1. If restraint is in response to the fear of dangerousness, are not institu-
tions of the Department of Correction and of the .Department of Mental Health
equally satisfactory?
2. If restraint is in response to the need for care cannot correctiona~ and
mental health institutions be equally satisfactory if they are both oriented to-
ward rehabilitation ?58 If the impact of the desire to neglect is to be minimized,
should not restraint be conditioned on the availability of a therapeutic oppor-
tunity?59
3. If restraint is in response to the need for destigmatization are not cor-
rectional and mental health institutions equally unsatisfactory?60
4. If restraint in either the correctional or mental health systems are equal-
ly satisfactory, what values or policies should be weighed against the flexibility
that might come with restraint in and easy transfer between both systems ?61
B. Restraint for what length of time?
1. If length of restraint is in response to the fear of dangerousness should
restraint be authorized for an indeterminate period? If the impact of the need
to neglect is to be minimized, should there be provision, in addition to habeas
corpus, for the automatic review, annually or semi-annually, of each person
57. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
58. "Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of
criminal jurisprudence." Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949). On prisons
outstripping hospitals as therapeutic communities see Diamond, Criminal Responsibility of
the Mentally Ill, 14 STAN. L. REV. S9 (1961) :
I do not hesitate to say that Vacaville [an integral part of California's correction
system] provides a higher standard of psychiatric treatment than does the corre-
sponding hospital for the cril1zinally insane . .. which is operated by the Department
of Mental Hygiene. [Emphasis supplied.]
Id. at 85.
59. See Ragsdale. v~ Overholser, 281 F.2d 943, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (concurring opinion
of Judge Fahy).
60. See State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 Pac. 1020, 1025 (1910). Star, The P'Itb-
lie's Idea About Mental Illness, reprinted in CRIMINAL LAW at 818.
61. See In re Maddox, 351 Mich. 358, 88 N.W.2d 470 (1957), holding "that incar-
ceration in penitentiary designed and used for the confinement of convicted criminals is not
a prescription available upon medical diagnosis and order to an administrative branch of
government." Id. at 370, 88 N.W.2d at 476. See note 5-1 ..rupra.
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restrained in terms of his present state of dangerousness ?62 If the impact of
the urge to punish is to be minimized, should length of restraint be limited to
the maximum sentence authorized for the crime committed ?63
2. If length of restraint is in response to the need for care should restraint
be authorized for an indeterminate period? If the impact of the need for neglect
is to be' minimized should 'provision, in addition to habeas corpus, be made for
the automatic annual review and report to all interested parties (judge, defense
attorney, etc.,) of the continued availability and use of therapy? If the impact
of the need for neglect is to be minimized should provision be made for estab-
lishing, reviewing and revising s~andards for therapeutic care?
3. If length of restraint is in respon'se to the need for destigmatization,
should there be any restraint? If the impact of the need to stigmatize is to be
minirriized can procedures' be developed to create an expectation in the com-
munity that release means a person is ready to participate in the life of the com-
munity."
c. Restraint for what crimes?
1. If restraint is in response to the fear of dangerousness, should certain
"less serious or less dangerous" offenses be excluded as a basis for such re-
straint ?65 If the impact of the urge to punish is to be minimized, should not all
crimes be included as the basis for such restraint ?
2. If restraint is in response to the' need for care, should not all crimes be
included as a basis for restraint? If the impact of the .need to neglect is to be
minimized, should not all crimes be included as a basis for restraint?
3. If restraint is in response to the need for destigmatization and if the label
of criminality added to the label of mentai sickne'ss increases stigma, should
not all crimes be excluded as' a basis for restraint? If, on the other hand, stigma
is decreased by such an association should not all crimes be a basis for such
restraint?
D. Restraint for what mental sicknesses?
1. If restraint is in response to the fear of dangerottsness should certain
"less dangerous" mental sicknesses as well as mental sicknesses currently un-
accompanied by overt symptomatology be excluded as a basis for restraint ?66
If the impact of the urge to punish is to be minimized should restraint be
limited to only those whose mental sickness could subject them to civil commit-
ment?
62. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17-244 (1958).
63. Ibid. and ide at § 17-246. Also see Katz & Goldstein, J., Dangerousness and Mental
Illness, 131 ]. OF NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 404, 410 (1960).
64. On status-elevation ceremonies see Goldstein, J., Police Discretion Not to Invoke
the Criminal Process: Low Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE
L.]. 543, 590-92 ( ~960) .
65. See ~ote, Exten:t of Harm to Victim, reprinted in CRIMINAL LAW at 30 (1962).
66. See Star, srl-pra note 60; Katz & Goldstein, J., supra note 63, at 411.
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2. If restraint is in response to the need for care should not all mental sick-
nesses be a basis for restraint ?67 If the impact of the need to neglect or to
punish is to be minimized should all non-treatable mental sicknesses 68 as well
as mental sicknesses currently unaccompanied by overt symptomatology be ex...
eluded as a basis for restraint ?69
3. If restraint is in response to the need for destigmatization and if the label
of mental sickness added to the label of criminality increases stigma, should
not all mental sicknesses be a basis for restraint? If, on· the other hand, stigma
is decreased by such an association should not all crimes be a basis for such
restraint?
E. Restraint at whose initiative and at w~at stages in the criminal process?
1. If restraint is in response to the fear of dangerousness should not the
issue be subject to resolution at the initiative of any participant at any stage of
the process? If the impact of the urge to punish as well as of the need for neg-
lect, including that evidenced by the inertia of system nlaintenance,70 is to be
minimized should not restraint be authorized at the initiative o.f any participant
but not before at least a finding by judge or jury that each of the material
elenlents of the offense charged have been established? If the impact of the
urge to punish' is to be minimized. must not evidence of mental sickness be
admissible to cast doubt on such material elements as voluntariness (however
defined) and mens rea (however defined) ? If the impact of the need for neg-
lect is to be minimized, must procedures be designed to encourage or force the
review of the bases for continuing restraint?
2. If restraint is in response to the need for care should not the issue be
raised on the initiative of any participant at any stage of the process? If the
possibility of treatment is hindered by the absence of personal motivation,
should invocation of the process for determining restraint be limited to the
67. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (2) (Prop<)'sed Official Draft 1962) defining mental
disease to exclude an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-
social conduct, reprinted supra note 23, and ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISH-
MENT REPORT, CMD No. 8932, at 73 (1953) limiting mental disease to psychosis.
68. Is non-treatable to mean no known treatment or no treatment facilities available
even if a known treatment? .See note 45 supra. Concerning the infectious tubercular as a
menace to society and 'provision for his commitment, see Moore v. Draper, 57 So. 2d 648
(Fla. 1952). "The real reason why no such law had been passed prior to that time [1949]
was because there were not sufficient hospitals or sanitaria provided by the state to properly
take care of these people." Id. at 648.
69. For example, "[s]chizophrenic symptoms are not necessarily present all the time.
In no other mental disease is it so uncertain whether or not a specific symptom wi-ll be
present at any given moment." BLEULER, DEMENTIA PRAECOX OR THE GROUP OF SCHIZO-
PHRENIAS 296 (1950) .. See also Currens v. United States, 290 F.2d 751, 761-63 (3d Cir.
1961) and Knight, Borderline States, 17 MENNINGER CLINIC BULL. 1 (1953), reprinted in
KNIGHT & FRIEDMAN, PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHIATRY AND PSYCHOLOGY 97 (1954).
70. On the meaning of "system maintenance" in another context see Goldstein, J.,
Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the
Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.]. 543, 574-75 nn.65-66 (1960).
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defendant ?71 If the impact of the need for neglect is to be minimized should
procedures be designed to permit and encourage interested participants to
review and challenge on a regular basis the continuation of restraint in terms
of current mental status, and the availability of treatment?
3. If restraint is in response to the need for destignwtization does it make
any difference who invokes the process for restraint as long as the issue of
restraint is resolved only after each of the material elements of the offense has
been established? If the i111pact of the urge to stignlatize is to be tninimized
must not evidence of mental sickness be admissible to cast doubt on such
Inaterial elements as voluntariness (however defined) and 11tenS rea (however
defined). If the impact of the urge to stigmatize is to be minimized should not
the issue be subject to resolution without formally entering a verdict of guilty
for the crime committed and procedures be designed to attribute to individuals
released from such restraint the capacity to participate adequately in the life
of the community?
In responding to these questions law111akers will be pouring meaning into
the fea.r of dangerousness, the need for care, and the need for destigmatization.
Though we would neither endorse nor propose them, some of the possible mean-
ings which might be given these factors are found for example in such a for-
mulation as:
Defendant shall be restrained in a mental health institution, whether or
not therapeutic opportunities exist, for a period not to exceed· the maxi-
mum sentence that tnight be imposed for the crinle·committed upon a find-
ing by judge or jury:
a. that the defendant has committed, in the light of all relevant evi-
dence including evidence of mental health, murder, robbery, rape, as-
sault, forgery or the use of narcotics; and
b. that he suffers from a mental sickness for which civil commit-
ment is not available and which is manifested by current overt symp-
tonlatology.
This procedure nlay be invoked by judge, prosecutor or defense counsel.
Other forl1lulations as well as the conclusion that there is no need for such
a procedure in the criminal process might result depending not only upon the
answers to the questions posed, but more fundamentally upon the results of a
detailed examination of the function, meaning and desirability of 1nens rea and
voluntariness as requisites of criminal liability.
As in music so in law, to recover lost passages it may be appropriate to sug-
gest da. capo 0.1 fi·ne.
71. See Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705 (1961), reversing 288 F.2d 388 (D.C. Cir.
1961) •
